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		But,	as	we	make	clear,	ours	is	a	study	of	legality.		Social media offers not only a seemingly 
passive dataset, but it also has significant purchase in thinking about the translations of legality in 
everyday life.  It may also  provide textual resources to resist a narrative  which Ôreinforces the image 
of there being a clear-cut divide between two sets of values Ð those of private, individualistic self-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with	 limited	numbers	 (particularly	 sanctuary	 schemes).
66
	 	 The	actual	 facts	of	 the	cases	were	again	
irrelevant	–	the	real	issue	was	whether	DHPs	saved	the	scheme	and	whether	MA	was	distinguishable	
on	 the	 facts.	 	 It	was	held	 that	 they	did	not	 in	 these	 limited	cases.	 	 In	Rutherford,	 the	Secretary	of	





to	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 a	 child	 as	 a	 primary	 consideration.	 He	 justified	 the	 distinction	
between	making	provision	for	a	bedroom	for	disabled	children	but	not	for	disabled	adults	by	
reference	 to	 the	best	 interests	 of	 the	 child	 and	 explained	 the	different	 treatment	 on	 that	
basis.	On	 that	 basis,	 it	 seems	 to	 us	 very	 difficult	 to	 justify	 the	 treatment	within	 the	 same	
regulation	of	carers	for	disabled	children	and	disabled	adults,	where	precisely	the	opposite	
result	 is	 achieved;	 provision	 for	 the	 carers	 of	 disabled	 adults	 but	 not	 for	 the	 carers	 of	




reason.	 	 Liberal	 law,	 in	 its	 objectivity	 and	 technical	 garb,	 has	 beaten	 the	DWP.
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	 	 Further,	 the	distinction	between	these	cases	and	MA	 is	
rather	harder	to	fathom.		Simply	because	these	cases	were	specific	and	small	 in	number	made	the	



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Conclusions: The bedroom tax and Twitter 
The	denigration	of	the	social	security	state	by	the	Coalition	government	has	been	one	of	the	defining	
features	of	austerity	politics.		In	many	respects,	the	bedroom	tax	is	the	apotheosis	of	that	
denigration,	producing	states	of	insecurity	for	people	who	can	ill-afford	that	insecurity.		The	failure	
of	the	judicial	reviews	did,	of	course,	produce	one	concession	–	that	without	discretionary	housing	
payments,	the	policy	potentially	would	have	been	in	contravention	of	Article	14	discrimination.		
However,	this	concession	is	entirely	in	accordance	with	DWP	policy.		It	enables	them	to	say	that	the	
bedroom	tax	has	reduced	housing	benefit	expenditure,	while	at	the	same	time	requiring	those	
affected	to	be	reliant	on	the	cash-limited,	locally	distributed,	discretionary	payment.		For	a	while,	the	
FTT	operated	as	some	sort	of	break	on	the	policy	in	individual	cases,	albeit	for	very	odd	reasons.		
However,	that	now	appears	as	an	aberration,	more	than	anything	else.	
Our	argument	in	this	paper,	however,	is	both	broader	and	simple.		Twitter	is	a	potentially	fantastic	
resource	for	socio-legal	researchers.		It	has	been	under-used.		Because	it	is	so	fast-moving,	one	can	
find	the	stabilisation	of	a	particular	idea,	the	tipping	point.		It	is	used	by	the	powerful	for	sure,	and	
much	Twitter-traffic	is	dull,	but	it	can	also	be	used	to	challenge	policy	and	practice.		The	lifetime	of	a	
policy	idea	can	now	be	very	short.		As	Jeffares	argues,	‘Hashtag	politics	is	a	practice	of	modern	
policy-making	where	policy	ideas	are	coined,	fostered	and	imbued	with	meaning	and	associations,	
before	eventually	being	overlooked,	forgotten	and	seldom	mentioned	again’.
115
			
Our	participants	offered	two	different	ways	of	using	Twitter	for	a	purpose	–	by	providing	
information,	to	arm	their	followers	and	other	recipients	with	information	to	challenge	dominant	or	
apparently	authoritative	narratives.		We	would	stress	the	ordinariness	of	our	research	sample	–	with	
no	disrespect	to	them,	who	probably	have	no	other	aspirations	–	but	their	reach	is	of	significance;	
indeed,	we	selected	them	for	our	study	precisely	because	of	their	choreographic	positionality.		Thus,	
the	promise	of	social	media	is	that	potentially	it	adds	to	the	available	techniques	that	flatten	power	
																																																													
114
	We	see	the	secondary	data	analysed	by	S.	Halliday	and	B.	Morgan	-	‘”I	fought	the	law	and	the	law	won?		
Legal	consciousness	and	the	critical	imagination’,	(2013)	66(1)	Current	Legal	Problems	1	-	as	essentially	making	
the	same	point	about	polyvocality	–	while	they	acknowledge	and	accept	the	limits	of	totalizing	schemes	and	
accept	that	‘much	will	be	found	in	the	spaces	between	the	ends	of	the	dimensional	spectrums’,	they	argue	
that	these	discourses	are	theoretically	productive.		
115
	P	145.	
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structures	and	spatial	imaginations.		This	is	spatial	governmentality	in	action;	it	is	uncontrollable,	
miasmic,	and	enables	actors	to	jump	spatial	scales.
116
	
If	socio-legal	scholars	are	interested	in	the	interstices	between	agency	and	structure,	in	
understanding	strategies	of	resistance,	as	well	as	the	mundane	(which	we	take	to	be	three	of	the	
most	significant	sites	of	study),	they	should	similarly	be	interested	in	following	the	Twitter	actor	
flows.		If	we	do	so,	and	make	that	our	starting	point,	we	may	end	up	with	a	rather	different	set	of	
understandings	of	legality	and	legal	spaces.
117
		In	this	way,	through	our	data,	we	have	sought	to	
develop	an	analysis	of	legality	and	protest,	demonstrating	how	social	media	may	offer	quite	
interesting	challenges	to	our	appreciations	of	that	literature.			
The	social	media	literature	review	offered	in	this	paper	also	provides	interesting	sparks	for	socio-
legal	researchers,	interested	in	the	uses	of,	as	well	as	controls	in,	virtual	and	public	spaces.		We	have	
been	drawn	particularly	to	the	helpful	analogy	of	choreography	in	this	paper,	as	each	of	our	
participants	was,	in	one	way	or	another,	seeking	to	choreograph	aspects	of	protest	against	the	
bedroom	tax.		However,	this	literature	also	reminds	us	(if	we	needed	reminding)	of	the	limits	of	
social	media,	and	of	the	ways	in	which	we	interact	both	with	it	and	beyond	it.		We	should	be	careful	
not	to	essentialise	social	media,	just	as	we	should	be	careful	to	emphasise	the	limits	of	our	data.	
One	particular	limit	of	our	study	is	that,	while	we	can	claim	that	our	participants	got	things	moving,	
we	cannot	claim	a	specific	impact	of	their	work	beyond	the	attempt	by	the	Smiling	Assassin	to	bring	
down	the	decision-making	bureaucracy.		It	may	be	that	many	of	those	others	are	‘slacktivists’,	but	it	
is	also	clear	that	targeted	information	provision,	publicisation	of	other	social	media	(like	blogs),	
alongside	other	strategies	might	make	a	difference.		We	cannot	claim	that	twitter	on	its	own	
provides	the	single	successful	protest	resource;	that	would	be	a	nonsense.		However,	it	does	proide	
a	relatively	new	method	of	co-ordinating	and	developing	a	protest	dance	(to	continue	the	
choreographic	metaphor).		The	bedroom	tax	still	exists	and	is	being	propped	up	by	the	discretionary	
housing	payments	system.		The	voices	of	protest	remain	on	twitter	and	elsewhere	in	the	blogging	
and	political	communities,	and	new	calls	for	its	abolition	are	made.		Yet,	the	response	to	the	final	
research	report	by	Lord	Freud	in	the	House	of	Lords	was	that	the	report	demonstrated	that	‘the	
policy	is	promoting	more	effective	use	of	housing	stock	and	encouraging	people	to	enter	work	and	
increase	their	earnings.	We	will	therefore	be	maintaining	the	policy	and	will	continue	to	protect	
vulnerable	claimants	who	require	additional	support	through	discretionary	housing	payments’.
118
	
There	are	other	ways	in	which	a	study	of	social	media	might	give	added	value,	for	example	by	
thinking	about	the	use	of	social	media	in	reference	to	understandings	of	legal	consciousness.		
Implicitly,	we	have	drawn	on	that	literature	in	this	article.		This	point	is,	perhaps	obvious.		Legality	is	
produced	socially	through	twitter	as	it	is	through	traditional	media	or	in	other	places,	like	queues.		
Nevertheless,	even	though	it	may	be	a	theoretically	obvious	point	to	make	-	that	twitter	is	a	site	of	
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	See,	for	example,	A.	Akinwumi,	‘Powers	of	reach:	Legal	mobilization	in	a	post-apartheid	redress	campaign’,	
(2012)	Social	and	Legal	Studies	1.	
117
	The	perhaps	counter-intuitive	sociology	of	the	door-closer	by	‘Jim	Johnson’,	aka	Bruno	Latour,	(in	‘Mixing	
humans	and	nonhumans	together:	The	sociology	of	a	door-closer’,	(1988)	35(3)	Social	Problems	298)	suggests	
some	interesting	narratives	which	might	be	developed	here,	particularly	about	human’s	lack	of	control	of	
technology.		
118
	House	of	Lords,	22	December	2015,	col	2441,	
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151222-0001.htm	
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legal	consciousness	–	our	relatively	simple	point	is	that	this	fact	has	been	overlooked	by	the	socio-
legal	community.
119
	
In	so	doing,	we	have	succumbed	to	the	temptation	to	see	legality	everywhere	–	but,	as	Mezey	
suggests,
120
	if	the	law	is	everywhere	so	much	that	it	is	nowhere,	how	can	we	speak	to	data	which	is	
apparently	extra-legal?		So,	for	example,	the	Understater	would	not	describe	his	role	or	perception	
as	‘legal’,	but	we	have	interpreted	his	data	through	that	lens.		That	may	be	because	of	the	totalising	
discourses	of	legality,	the	fact	that	our	primary	discipline	is	law	and	we	consequently	‘see’	legality	as	
being	all	around	us;
121
	and/or	the	instrumental	fact	that	this	paper	is	designed	in	part	as	a	socio-legal	
reflection	on	legality.		It	may	also	be	a	consequence	of	what	Cotterell	regarded	as	the	
meaninglessness	of	the	inside-outside	demarcation	between	law	and	sociology.
122
		However,	in	
drawing	on	the	breadth	of	the	idea	of	legality,	we	have	also	demonstrated	the	ways	in	which	our	
social	media	users	sought	to	challenge	the	right	of	the	law	to	provide	the	official	account	of	their	
lived	realities.	
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diverse	economies,	and	the	sharing	economy’,	(2015)	42(4)	JLS	556.	
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	N.	Mezey,	‘Out	of	the	ordinary:	Law,	power,	culture,	and	the	commonplace’,	(2001)	26(1)	Law	and	Social	
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